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MATCHING FOR
ADOPTION: A STUDY
OF CURRENT TRENDS*
Theoretically, the primary purpose of adoption procedures' is to serve
the best interests of the child Unfortunately, the application of matching
requirements sometimes contravenes this principle by precluding or signi-
ficantly delaying adoption. Matching refers to the practice of placing a
child with adoptive parents who, based upon a number of factors,3 are
similar4 to the child's biological parents. ' Although uniformly applied by
adoption agencies and courts 10 to 20 years ago, many matching criteria
are employed less frequently and rigidly today.,
* This article is a student work prepared by the St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Re-
search.
Adoption is solely a creature of statute, for at common law no right of adoption existed. In
re Taggart's Estate, 190 Cal. 493, 213 P. 504 (1923). Adoption proceedings are controlled by
state rather than federal legislation, and by state court and agency determinations. For a
discussion of how highly developed an institution adoption is in the United States, see Baran,
Pannor & Sorosky, Adoptive Parents and the Sealed Record Controversy, 55 SOCIAL CASEWORK
531 (1974).
2 The best interests of the child test was first formulated almost a century ago in Chapsky v.
Wood, 26 Kan. 650, 654 (1881), a custody proceeding, wherein the court stated, "the para-
mount consideration is, what will promote the welfare of the child?," and can be found in
numerous legislative and judicial determinations regarding adoption proceedings. A publica-
tion containing a series of standards formulated by the Child Welfare League of America for
agency use, states that "[t]he primary purpose of an adoption service is to help children
.... .CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, STANDARDS FOR ADOPTION SERVICE 2 (rev. ed.
1973). While both courts and agencies consistently advocate primary concern for the child,
it is questionable whether this concern is always carried out in practice.
1 For a discussion of various matching factors, including religion, race, nationality, physical
characteristics, and age, see Comment, Adoptions for the Hard to Place: The Role of the
Court and the Trend Against Matching, 25 U. MIAMI L. REV. 749 (1971).
Elizabeth S. Cole, director of the North American Center on Adoption, described matching
in terms of the "as though born principle." Personal interview with Elizabeth S. Cole, director
of the North American Center on Adoption, New York, New York, Oct. 9, 1975.
"' The distinction between "biological parents," a term designating those who have physically
parented the child, and "psychological parents," designating those with whom the child has
established a close, loving, parent-child relationship, was postulated in J. GOLDSTEIN, A.
FREUD & S. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 16-20 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as GOLDSTEIN]. In this article, the applicable terms as distinguished and defined in Beyond
the Best Interests of the Child shall be utilized. The authors of this work stress unqualified
concern for the welfare of the child.
In the past, it was common practice to attempt to match according to hair and eye coloring,
I.Q. level, and temperament. These criteria are considered less relevant today. Johnson, The
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There are presently three primary matching criteria: race, religion,
and age. This article will attempt to present an objective overview of the
trends and viewpoints found in the area of adoptive matching.
THE RACIAL FACTOR
"[A] white home is not a suitable placement for Black children and .. is
totally unnecessary.-"
"Transracial adoption is a solution for many children now, and.. should
[not] be discouraged. "I
Whether a child of one race should be adopted by parents of a different
race is a highly controversial question. This issue is directly affected by the
large number of nonwhite children available for adoption, the correspond-
ingly large number of white parents seeking to adopt, and the apparent
scarcity of nonwhite adoptive parents.' As a result of these factors, non-
white children frequently must be placed with white families. 10
Interracial adoption, which in the vast majority of cases involves the
placement of black children with white parents," has provoked a variety
of responses. For example, the Association of Black Social Workers, an
organization vehemently opposed to transracial adoption, maintains that
white families are unable to prepare a black child to cope effectively with
our "racist" society.' 2 The organization insists that interracial adoptibn
Business in Babies, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1975, § 6 (Magazine), at 66.
National Association of Black Social Workers News, Jan. 1973, at 4, col. 2.
Vieni, Transracial Adoption is a Solution Now, 20 SOCIAL WORK 419, 421 (1975).
See Chimezie, Transracial Adoption of Black Children, 20 SOCIAL WORK 296 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Chimeziel.
'o For an extensive discussion of the plight of the black adoptive child in America, see
Grossman, A Child of a Different Color: Race as a Factor in Adoption and Custody
Proceedings, 17 BUFFALO L. REV. 303 (1968).
" Due to the paucity of decisional law in the area, this article will not cover the problems
posed by the adoption of Vietnamese babies by American couples. For a recent study of this
phenomenon, see Johnson, The Business in Babies, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1975, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 11.
2 National Association of Black Social Workers News, Jan. 1973, at 1, col. 1. An opposing
view was expressed in Commonwealth ex rel. Lucas v. Kreischer, 450 Pa. 352, 299 A.2d 243
(1973), wherein the court, adopting portions of the dissenting opinion in the lower court,
noted:
"[lin a multiracial society such as ours racial prejudice and tension are inevitable. If
. . . children are raised in a happy and stable home, they will be able to cope with
prejudice and hopefully learn that people are unique individuals who should be judged
as such."
Id. at 356, 299 A.2d at 246, quoting 221 Pa. Super. 196, 207, 289 A.2d 202, 207 (1972). For
other cases upholding the proposition that a child does not suffer from placement in an
interracial home, see Stingley v. Wesch, 77 Ill. App. 2d 472, 222 N.E.2d 505 (1966); Potter v.
Potter, 372 Mich. 637, 127 N.W.2d 320 (1964).
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may result in the black child's lack of ethnic identification and survival.'"
It is uniformly agreed that it is in the best interests of a black child
to be placed in a black home if one is available." Yet, because of the
shortage of such homes in comparison to the disproportionate number of
black children awaiting adoption, such an arrangement is not always possi-
ble. As a result of this disparity, many believe interracial adoption to be a
necessity.'5 The only available alternative is either an extended stay in an
institution or a series of placements in foster homes. In light of the unani-
mous agreement among child experts that a stable home life with its at-
tendant security and continuity 6 is essential to a child's emotional and
psychological well-being, 7 it is apparent that neither alternative provides
a satisfactory solution.
Interestingly, some opponents of interracial adoption do not believe
that relatively few black parents are seeking to adopt. They insist that
suitable black homes are in fact available and attribute the apparent
1:1 Neal, Black Adoption Program, New York Chapter News, Association of Black Social
Workers, Jan. 1975, at 1, col. 1; National Association of Black Social Workers News, Jan.
1973, at 1, col. 1. See also Chimezie, supra note 9, at 298.
1 See, e.g., L. GROW & D. SHAPIRO, BLACK CHILDREN-WHITE PARENTS (1974), which states
that "no one disputes the preferability of a black home for a black child." Id. at 239.
' , The position of the Child Welfare League of America, which recommends standards for
adoption services to voluntary agencies, is described in the following statement:
Although the Child Welfare League has always stressed the desirability of placing
children with families of the same racial or ethnic background, it has also taken the
position that a child should not be deprived of a family because of the unavailability
of one of the same race.
Preface to id. at i.
'1 As was stated by one court, "[orphanages are all well and good but they do not provide
a real home. ... In re Baker, 117 Ohio App. 26, 28, 185 N.E.2d 51, 53 (1962).
17 See Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Remedy for
Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1207 (1969), wherein the author
states:
Any psychiatrist or psychologist, experienced parent, grandparent, or teacher will state
that when there has already been one upheaval in the child's life due to divorce or some
other misfortune, the first and foremost requirement for the child's health and proper
growth is stability, security, and continuity ....
Id. at 1208-09, quoted in In re S, 538 P.2d 947, 948 (Ore. Ct. App. 1975). Dr. A. Watson, a
psychiatrist and professor of law, has noted that stability "is practically the principal element
in raising children, especially pre-puberty ones." NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS, PROCEEDINGS OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM DIVORCE AND MARRIAGE
ACT 98 (1968). Dr. H. Modlin of the Menninger Foundation emphasized the importance of
"constancy of mothering" and the need for family and a sense of belonging in his remarks at
the 1963 proceedings of the American Bar Association's Family Law Section. 1963 ABA
FAMILY LAW SECTION 39. For further discussion of the importance of a stable home environ-
ment, see J. BOWLBY, MATERNAL CARE AND MENTAL HEALTH 101 (1951); H. CLARK, THE LAW
OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 326 (1968); D. DIETZ, CHILD WELFARE: SERVICES AND PROSPECTIVFS 101-
10 (1969); A. WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS 197 (1968); Stone, Children Without Roots,
27 SOCIAL SERV. REV. 144 (1953); Freud, Cindy, in J. GOLDSTEIN & J. KATZ, THE FAMIlY AND
THE LAW 1051, 1053 (1965).
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scarcity to the allegedly discriminatory practices of adoption agencies."
Agencies are criticized for the use of inferior recruitment methods in their
search for black adoptive parents and application of higher standards to
black couples." Although this argument may have some validity, the fact
remains that until agencies cease to discriminate against blacks, if in fact
they do so discriminate, more black babies will be available for adoption
than can be matched with black parents. The absolute preclusion of inter-
racial adoption, as advocated by certain groups, would appear to be a
harsh penalty to impose on black children. "'
A solution to this problem may lie in a reevaluation by the agencies
of their primary goal, which should be, without qualification, the best
interests of the child. Since any delay in placement is detrimental to the
child,'2 agencies should make a conscious effort to recruit more black par-
ents while concurrently placing children ready for adoption in available
homes without delay and regardless of racial differences. In the event black
parents cannot be found, it would appear that placement of a black child
with white parents is preferable to institutional or foster home care. 22
The issue of race in adoption proceedings is presently affected by two
basic types of legislation. A statute may either make no mention of the
weight to be given the racial factor, or prohibit racial discrimination en-
tirely. A third variety of legislation, specifically prohibiting interracial
adoptions, has been invalidated as a denial of the fourteenth amendment
guarantee of equal protection.2
Telephone interview with Leora Neal, C.S.W., chairperson of the Association of Black
Social Workers Adoption Committee, Oct. 14, 1975. See Chimezie, supra note 9.
1' E.g., Complaint for Plaintiff at 8, Child v. Beame, Civil No. 75-336 (S.D.N.Y.. filed Apr.
23, 1975), appearing in 173 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 24, 1975, at 1, cols. 5-6.
"' As explained in Grossman, A Child of a Different Color: Race as a Factor in Adoption and
Custody Proceedings, 17 BUFFALO L. REV. 303 (1968),
if even one child in an interracial home finds love and acceptance where he might have
found neither, and if he grows to a sounder maturity as a result, then interracial
adoption and custody placements will have served a useful purpose in American so-
ciety.
Id. at 346-47.
-' See note 17 supra.
z The obvious damage caused by institutional and foster home care would seem to outweigh
that which may be caused by interracial-placement. See generally L. GRow & D. SHAPIRO,
BLACK CHILDREN-WHITE PARENTS (1974). For further discussion of the harmful effects of
institutional and foster home care, see Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected"
Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 994-95 (1975).
": See In re Gomez, 424 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), wherein a black man petitioned
to adopt his wife's two white daughters although the applicable Texas statute, ch. 177, § 8
119311 Tex. Laws 302 (repealed 1973), provided: "No white child can be adopted by a negro
person, nor can a negro child be adopted by a white person." A similar statute, ch. 428, § 4
119471 Tex. Laws 428 (repealed 1973), provided: "No white person can be adopted by a negro
person, nor can a negro person be adopted by a white person." Undoubtedly influenced by a
desire to legitimize the children, the Gomez court granted the adoption petition. Although it
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Although a state may not bar interracial adoptions, race still remains
a relevant factor in most jurisdictions." At least six jurisdictions presently
require a statement in the adoption petition indicating the race of one or
all of the parties.25 In In re De F.,25 the petitioners refused to comply with
statutory regulations mandating that certain racial and religious informa-
tion be supplied on the adoption petition, alleging that this requirement
was unconstitutional. Since the requested information was readily avail-
able, the court deemed the petition amended so as to include such informa-
tion and thereby avoided the constitutional issue. Thus, the constitution-
ality of statutory provisions demanding a statement of race remains sub-
ject to question.
The majority of jurisdictions, including those requiring racial informa-
tion, do not indicate in their legislation what weight should be given the
racial factor, but rather leave such considerations to the discretion of agen-
cies and courts. The judicial view of the racial factor is exemplified by
would have been possible to limit the holding to the particular facts of the case, the court
chose to invalidate the statute on the ground that under the fourteenth amendment no state
may make a distinction in the treatment of persons based solely on race. The court main-
tained:
"[No State can directly dictate or casually promote a distinction in the treatment
of persons solely on the basis of their color . . . . No form of State discrimination, no
matter how subtle, is permissible under the guarantees of the Fourteenth amendment
freedoms."
424 S.W.2d at 658-59, quoting Hamn v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156,
157-58 (E.D. Va.) (three-judge court), aff'd per curiam, 379 U.S. 19 (1964).
Several years later, a federal court invalidated a similar statute forbidding racially mixed
adoptions. Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. La. 1972). In Compos, the pertinent
statute provided that "[a] single person over the age of twenty-one years, or a married couple
jointly, may petition to adopt any child of his or their race." No. 288, § 2, [19481 La. Acts.
In general, the Supreme Court has struck down statutes that discriminate on the basis of race.
See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (prohibition of interracial marriage);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (interracial cohabitation prohibition); Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (prohibition of racial segregation in public schools). In Bolling,
the Court stated that: "Classifications based solely on race must be scrutinized with particu-
lar care; since they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect." Id. at
499 (footnote omitted).
11 See, e.g., Fountaine v. Fountaine, 9 II. App. 2d 482, 133 N.E.2d 532 (1956); Comment,
Race as a Consideration in Adoption and Custody Proceedings, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 256.
2. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 16-305 (1973), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.071 (1969); IND. ANN. S'rAT.
§ 31-3-1-2 (Burns, Supp. 1975), IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.1 (Supp. 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1,
§ 401 (Supp. 1975); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.060 (1974). Ohio prescribes that in the investiga-
tion of the prospective adoptive parents, an examination must be made of their racial and
religious affiliations as an indication of their parental suitability. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3107.05 (Page 1972). S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-13 (1967) mandates that a statement
on the color or race of the parties be included in the order of adoption. The legislative histories
of other states indicate that such statutory directives were only recently deleted, thus demon-
strating the legislative trend away from matching requirements. See, e.g., No. 168, 119531
Mich. Pub. Acts 44 (repealed 1975); ch. 127, § 2 [19431 N.H. Pub. Acts 174 (repealed 1973).
" 307 A.2d 737 (D.C. Ct. App. 1973).
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decisions such as In re a Minor,27 wherein the court explained that the
racial factor, although significant, could not exclusively determine the
child's welfare. 2 The Minor court permitted a black stepfather to adopt
the illegitimate white child of his wife since the adoption was in the best
interests of the child. Similarly, in In re Baker,29 wherein the adoption
involved a child of mixed nationality, the court noted that "[u]nder ordi-
nary circumstances, a child should be placed in a family [of] the same
racial, religious and cultural backgrounds. . . . "3 Nevertheless, since the
child's background made placement difficult, 3' the court permitted a Japa-
nese woman and her Caucasian husband to adopt a child of English and
Hispanic ancestry.
New York, which requires neither a statement nor an investigation of
the race, color, or ethnic origins of the parties involved, ' 2 is typical of such
jurisdictions. Agencies and courts often impose their own standards when
weighing the racial factor. In two well-known decisions,'3 3 the Family Court
of New York County severely criticized both the Department of Welfare
and the adoptive agencies for their laxness in finding certain children
permanent homes. In the first case, In re Bonez, 34 the court related the
lengthy history of an agency's treatment of a child who had been in the
agency's custody for 4 years, during which time no legal steps were taken
to free her for adoption. The agency had continually requested extensions
from the court in its search for a family similar to the child " 'in coloring
and cultural descent.' ,,35 Finally, the court ordered the child removed to
the custody of another agency which had agreed to provide an adoptive
home without further delay. In its opinion, the court noted the harmful
effects of delayed placement, specifically mentioning both the possible
irreparable damage to the child, a likelihood which unfortunately is often
overlooked, and the extra expense to the taxpayer.
31
Finding a forum in In re P.37 for a discussion of the equal protection
rights of children, the Family Court of New York County urged that adop-
tion policies and practices be reexamined and modified to provide equal
services for children regardless of race, color, or religion. If such modifica-
27 228 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
11 Id. at 448.
117 Ohio App. 26, 185 N.E.2d 51 (1962).
Id. at 28, 185 N.E.2d at 53.
Id. at 27, 185 N.E.2d at 52.
32 The only statutory or state constitutional requirements for matching in New York are those
dealing with religion. See note 65 infra.
In re P., 52 Misc. 2d 528, 276 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Family Ct. N.Y. County 1966); In re Bonez,
50 Misc. 2d 1080, 272 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Family Ct. N.Y. County 1966).
:1 50 Misc. 2d 1080, 272 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Family Ct. N.Y. County 1966).
:1 Id. at 1088, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
31 Id. at 1089, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
37 52 Misc. 2d 528, 276 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Family Ct. N.Y. County 1966).
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tions were not implemented, the court warned, "the racist and religious
barriers to equal services . . . will continue to deny [children] the equal
protection to which they are entitled.""s
Children currently in agency facilities and foster homes in New York
City have brought a class action suit against the administrators of the
child-care agencies. In Child v. Beame," the plaintiffs, represented by the
New York Civil Liberties Union, claim that they are being denied place-
ment in adoptive homes because of administrative procedures that result
in unnecessarily long stays in foster homes. They allege that agency admin-
istrators apply arbitrary, inconsistent, and unrealistic standards in evalu-
ating nonwhite parents and in classifying nonwhite children as nonadopt-
able."' Plaintiffs also contend that interracial adoptions are discouraged,
thereby decreasing the availability of adoptive homes for the majority of
prospective adoptees in need of placement, viz nonwhite children.', Basing
their claim upon constitutional and statutory grounds, plaintiffs allege:
First, a denial of equal protection and due process under the fourteenth
amendment; second, a denial of a permanent and stable home under both
the first and ninth amendments and Title IV of the Federal Social Security
Act; 12 and third, that the agencies' procedures result in cruel and unusual
punishment under the eighth amendment. In the event the litigants in
Beame prove successful, it may establish a constitutional right in New
York that will mandate procedures facilitating placement for homeless
children of all races.
Although most jurisdictions leave the racial factor to the discretion of
the agencies and courts, a specific prohibition of discrimination can be
found in one state. In 1972, the legislature of Kentucky enacted a statute
that precluded denial of an adoption petition "on the basis of the religious,
ethnic, racial, or interfaith background of the adoptive applicant."" This
seemingly liberal mandate is qualified, however, by the last sentence of the
statute, which permits a denial of the adoption if it would be "contrary to
the expressed wishes of the natural parent(s)." 4 Hence, if the parents
specify a preference for, or against, placement with adoptive parents of a
particular race or religion, that request, according to the statute, must be
Id. at 533, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 262.
" Civil No. 75-336 (S.D.N.Y., filed Apr. 23, 1975), discussed in 173 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 24, 1975,
at 1, cols. 5-6.
Complaint for Plaintiff, Child v. Beame, Civil No. 75-336 (S.D.N.Y., filed Apr. 23, 1975),
appearing in 173 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 24, 1975, at 1, cols. 5-6; Memorandum of Law in Opposition
to Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Plaintiff, id. The nonwhite children, those most likely
to be denied their constitutional and federal statutory rights, allegedly comprise a special
subclass of plaintiffs. Id.
I IId.
'2 Federal Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-06 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV,
1974).
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.471 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
"Id.
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followed. Only in the absence of any stated parental preference does the
statute preclude denial of an adoption petition on the basis of race.
Whether the qualification declared in this provision can withstand
constitutional attack on equal protection grounds is unknown at this time,
for the courts have not yet handed down any decision interpreting this
legislation.
THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR
The most significant factor utilized by agencies in their placement
determinations and by courts in their decisions to approve or deny adop-
tion petitions, has been, and continues to be, religion. In fact, numerous
statutory directives require that a petition state the religion of the parties
to the adoption.",
There exist two sharply divided schools of thought concerning the
relative importance to be placed on the child's temporal and spiritual
welfare. Proponents of religious matching contend that parental religious
affiliation must be maintained in order to ensure what they consider to be
a primary concern in adoption-the child's spiritual well-being. Those
opposed to religious matching, however, argue that the daily secular needs
of the child must take priority.
Emphasizing the importance of temporal interests, supporters of the
latter philosophy often insist that religion is a matter of education, rather
than genetics, and is therefore an extraneous factor in most adoption pro-
ceedings.", They feel that religion should be considered only in the case of
a child who is old enough to have an awareness of his or her religious
identification.17 When a child is placed for adoption, normally either the
biological parents have consented voluntarily to the adoption or their con-
sent has been deemed unnecessary because of incapacity, abandonment,
or neglect."6 After the adoption order has been issued, all the rights and
obligations of the biological parents are assumed by the adoptive parents. 9
", See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-105 (1974); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 911 (1974); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-305 (1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-411 (1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, §§ 9.1-6, 9.1-15
(Smith-Hurd 1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.1 (Supp. 1975); LA. REV. STAT. § 13:1581 (Cum.
Supp. 1962); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 67 (1973); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 5B (Supp.
1974); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.05 (Page 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 401, 425 (Supp.
1975); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.32.060, 26.32.090 (1974); Wisc. STAT. § 48.82 (1974).
1 See Hauser, Adoption and Religious Control, 54 A.B.A.J. 771, 772 (1968). See also Note,
Religion and Adoption-Constitutionality of Religious Matching Practices, 17 WAYNE L. REV.
1509, 1536 (1971), wherein the writer argues that "[rieligious matching provisions invariably
injure people of all faiths."
17 MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 67 (1973) codifies this concept by providing that religion is to be
a factor only if the child has a sufficient religious background. Maryland is, however, the only
state to make this distinction.
' See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
'9 See, e.g., id. § 117.
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Thus, it is claimed that since all other rights of the biological parents are
relinquished, so also should the right to require a particular religious up-
bringing.
The traditional school of thought, adhering to the ancient maxim
"religio sequitur patrem," .1 posits that the religion of the child is prima
facie that of the parents." Proponents of this view demand that a child be
placed with adoptive parents of his or her religious faith. While insisting
that religion remain a prime consideration in adoption proceedings, advo-
cates of this theory also recognize the need to maintain concern for the
temporal best interests of the child..52
Whatever one's position on the relative importance of maintaining a
child's religious affiliation, courts can be criticized for sometimes overlook-
ing already formed parent-child attachments. When a child who has been
living with prospective parents for a considerable period of time is removed
solely because of a lack of religious matching, an existing parent-child
relationship is destroyed. Fortunately, courts are becoming increasingly
aware of the damaging effects which such a removal can have upon the
child.'
The religious factor can be examined within the framework of two
possible approaches: the mandatory approach, in which religion is thought
to be controlling, and the discretionary approach, wherein religion is con-
sidered relevant, but not determinative.
In In re Goldman,4 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
followed a mandatory approach in denying an adoption petition by a Jew-
-, This maxim has been interpreted as meaning that: "The father's religion is prima facie
the infant's religion. Religion will follow the father." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1455 (rev. 4th
ed. 1968). For detailed discussion of this principle, see Friedman, The Parental Right to
Control the Religious Education of a Child, 29 HARV. L. REV. 485 (1916). The importance of
religion in adoption proceedings was emphasized by the New York Court of Appeals as
recently as 1972. Chief Judge Fuld, speaking for a unanimous court, declared that "[rleligion
has always been a relevant and important, though not controlling, consideration in this State
... " Dickens v. Ernesto, 30 N.Y.2d 61, 64, 281 N.E.2d 153, 154, 330 N.Y.S.2d 346, 347
(1972). See Starr v. DeRocco, 24 N.Y.2d 1011, 250 N.E.2d 240, 302 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1969) (per
curiam); In re Maxwell, 4 N.Y.2d 429, 151 N.E.2d 848, 176 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1958).
" See, e.g., Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 80 N.E. 802 (1907), wherein the court
declared: "[Tlhe parents' religion is prima facie the infant's religion, and the infant should
be brought up in that religion and protected against disturbing influences from persons of a
different religious faith .... Id. at 200, 80 N.E. at 805 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
'I For example, the quotation in note 51 supra concludes with a highly significant reservation:
"[Blut the infant's welfare must be first of all regarded and its requirements must be treated
as paramount." 195 Mass. at 200, 80 N.E. at 805 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
•-":' See, e.g., In re Maxwell, 4 N.Y.2d 429, 151 N.E.2d 848, 176 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1958), wherein
the court expressed concern over "wiping out a relationship between foster parents and child
which originated in good faith and has continued for the entire four and a half years of the
youngster's life." Id. at 434, 151 N.E.2d at 852, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 284-85. The importance of a
stable home life is discussed in note 17 and accompanying text supra.
" 331 Mass. 647, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 942 (1955).
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ish couple who had cared for two 3-year-old children of Catholic parentage
since they were approximately 2 weeks old. The pertinent state statute
provided that "[in making orders for adoption, the judge when practi-
cable must give custody to persons of the same religious faith as that of
the child."55 The Massachusetts court interpreted the term "when prac-
ticable" as a legislative mandate to place children with adoptive parents
of the same religion if such parents were available, and consequently af-
firmed the trial court's holding that it would not be in the children's best
interests to be adopted by parents of a different faith.5 1
The Massachusetts statutory language has since been amended to
delete the words "when practicable" and to add the directive that in an
adoption proceeding all relevant factors are to be considered.17 The present
provisions indicate that if a parent specifically requests that the child be
placed with adoptive parents of the same religion, that request should be
granted, provided that it is in the best interests of the child. "' This statute
has not yet been interpreted by the courts, but the manifest legislative
intent seems to require that the interests of the child take precedence over
parental religious preferences. As a result of these amendments, religion
- Ch. 737, § 3, [19501 Mass. Laws 612, as amended, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 5B
(Supp. 1976) provided:
In making orders for adoption, the judge when practicable must give custody only to
persons of the same religious faith as that of the child. In the event that there is a
dispute as to the religion of said child, its religion shall be deemed to be that of its
mother.
If the court, with due regard for the religion of the child, shall nevertheless grant
the petition for adoption of a child proffered by a person or persons of a religious faith
or persuasion other than that of the child, the court shall state the facts which impelled
it to make such a disposition and such statement shall be made part of the minutes of
the proceedings.
(emphasis added).
11 It should be noted that the petitioners in this case were dark complexioned with dark hair
whereas the children had blond hair and blue eyes, a fact which may have affected the
decision. 331 Mass. at 649, 121 N.E.2d at 844.
A few years earlier, in In re Gally, 329 Mass. 143, 107 N.E.2d 21 (1952), the same
Massachusetts court, in passing upon an adoption petition, stated that it was "bound to give
controlling effect to identity of religious faith 'when practicable'...." Id. at 149, 107 N.E.2d
at 25 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, in Gally, the court concluded that because of the
particular facts, viz, a 2-year-old in poor health who had been in the petitioners' care for a
considerable time, it would not be practicable to limit custody to parents of the same faith
as that of the child. Id. The Gaily quotation was cited several years later in Ellis v. McCoy,
332 Mass. 254, 124 N.E.2d 266 (1955). In Ellis, a 4-year-old girl was removed from the home
of a Jewish couple with whom she had lived since birth after her biological mother, a Catholic,
revoked her consent to the adoption upon learning of the religion of the adoptive couple.
Although the court remarked on the obvious hardship of its decision to the petitioners, it
made no mention of the hardship inflicted on the child. Id. at 259, 124 N.E.2d at 269.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 5B (Supp. 1976), amending ch. 737, § 3 [19501 Mass.
Laws 612.
: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 5B (Supp. 1976).
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presumably will no longer be a controlling factor in placing children in
adoptive homes in Massachusetts.
Although the mandatory approach still enjoys some vitality, the ma-
jority of jurisdictions now subscribe to a discretionary theory and regard
religion as a significant, but not controlling, factor." This approach was
followed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re "E"," wherein the
court focused on the adoptive parents' lack of religious affiliation rather
than on a difference between their faith and that of the child. The court
maintained that while a petitioner's religion should be relevant as a guide
in considering moral and ethical fitness,' it is not controlling.
6 2
It should be noted that since identical statutory language may be
interpreted differently in various states, the approach taken in jurisdic-
tions with similar statutes may yet vary greatly. Thus, the term "when
practicable, 6 3 which was definitively construed as a mandatory directive
in Massachusetts, 4 remains the subject of continual debate in New York. "'
See, e.g., Cooper v. Hinrichs, 10 Ill. 2d 269, 140 N.E.2d 293 (1957).
59 N.J. 36, 279 A.2d 785 (1971). For discussions of this case, see Comment, A Study of
Religious Requirements for Adoption, 76 DICK. L. REV. 529 (1972); Comment, In re Adoption
of E: First Amendment Rights and Religious Inquiry in Adoption Proceedings, 24 MAINE L.
REV. 149 (1972); 17 VILL. L. REV. 591 (1972).
" 59 N.J. at 50, 279 A.2d at 792. Chief Judge Weintraub, in his concurring opinion, agreed
with the result reached by the majority but contended that neither inquiry nor investigation
into the religious views of adoptive parents should be made. Id. at 58, 279 A.2d at 797
(Weintraub, C.J., concurring).
12 Id. at 48, 279 A.2d at 791.
11 "Practicable" has been defined as "that which may be done, practiced, or accomplished,
that which is performable, feasible, possible .... " BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1335 (rev. 4th
ed. 1968). In In re Gally, 329 Mass. 143, 107 N.E.2d 21, 25 (1952), "practicable" was found
to mean "feasible-capable of being put into useful practice."
See notes 54-56 and accompanying text supra.
' By far the most extensive system of legislative regulation in the area of religious matching
is found in New York: the State Constitution, the Domestic Relations Law, the Family Court
Act, and the Social Services Law all employ the "when practicable" directive. N.Y. CONST.
art. VI, § 32 provides:
When any court having jurisdiction over a child shall commit it or remand it to an
institution or agency or place it in the custody of any person by parole, placing out,
adoption or guardianship, the child shall be committed or remanded or placed, when
practicable, in an institution or agency governed by persons, or in the custody of a
person, of the same religious persuasion as the child.
(emphasis added). N.Y. DaM. REL. LAW § 113 (McKinney Supp. 1975) provides in pertinent
part: "In making orders of adoption the judge or surrogate when practicable must give
custody only to persons of the same religious faith as that of the adoptive child ....
(emphasis added). N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT §§ 116(a)-(b) (McKinney 1975) provide that when-
ever a child is placed by the court in an institution or by an institution in a home, placement
must be "when practicable . . . [with] persons of the same religious faith or persuasion as
that of the child." (emphasis added). N.Y. SOc. SERV. LAW § 373 (1)-(3) (McKinney 1976)
provides that placement of a child in an institution or a home must be "when practicable"
to "persons of the same religious faith as that of the child." (emphasis added). This provision
further explains that the aforementioned subsections of the Social Services Law "shall be so
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The phrase was first considered by the New York Court of Appeals in In
re Maxwell," wherein the court stated that the religious affiliation require-
ments allow a judge "discretion to approve as adoptive parents persons of
a faith different from the child's in exceptional situations.'1 7 In Maxwell,
the unusual facts were that the biological mother had originally signed an
affidavit of nonbelief, but later claimed to be Catholic." Moreover, the
Protestant adoptive parents, with whom the child had been living for over
4 years, agreed to have the child baptized and educated as a Catholic.
Under these circumstances, it may be argued that the case does not in fact
represent a true cross-religious adoption, and therefore the holding must
be limited to those instances where the adoptive parents consent to raise
the child in the biological parents' religion."9
If Maxwell is to be accepted as the judicial prescript of New York
State, it is curious that the discretionary interpretation it seemed to estab-
lish was not applied in Starr v. De Rocco.' The Starr court, finding rela-
tives of the same faith as the child to be suitable parents, refused to allow
the child to remain with other relatives of a different faith despite their
promise to raise the child in his own religion. A strong dissent argued that
a sufficient reason for rejecting the relatives with the same religious affilia-
tion as the child's was that they resided in the town where the tragic
murder-suicide deaths of the child's biological parents had taken place.7'
The majority apparently did not find this a sufficiently exceptional situa-
tion.
In 1970, New York enacted statutory provisions designed to "so far as
consistent with the best interests of the child, and where practicable, be
applied so as to give effect to the religious wishes . . . of the parents. 7 2 It
interpreted as to assure that in the care, protection, adoption, guardianship, discipline and
control of any child, its religious faith shall be preserved and protected." Id.
" 4 N.Y.2d 429, 151 N.E.2d 848, 176 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1958). For a comprehensive discussion of
the religious factor in New York, see Comment, The Religious Factor in New York Adoption
Proceedings, 18 SYRACUSE L. REv. 825 (1967).
17 4 N.Y.2d at 434, 151 N.E.2d at 850, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 284 (emphasis added). In a vigorous
dissenting opinion, Judge Desmond argued for a mandatory interpretation of the statutory
language. Id. at 435, 151 N.E.2d at 851, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 285 (Desmond, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 432, 151 N.E.2d at 849, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 282. The Court had first decided that the
mother's conduct constituted abandonment and thus dispensed with the need for her consent.
See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
" An unwarranted extension of Maxwell occurred in In re Anonymous, 46 Misc. 2d 928, 261
N.Y.S.2d 439 (Family Ct. Dutchess County 1965), wherein the court erroneously referred to
Maxwell as standing for the proposition that an unwed mother affiliated with the Protestant
religion could lawfully consent to her child's being raised in the Jewish faith. Id. at 929, 261
N.Y.S.2d at 441.
71 24 N.Y.2d 1011, 250 N.E.2d 240, 302 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1969) (per curiam).
7, Id. at 1012, 250 N.E.2d at 241, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 836 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
71 Ch. 494, §§ 1-2, [1970] N.Y. Laws (codified at N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 373(7) (McKinney
1976); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 116(g) (McKinney 1975)). These statutes further provide that
"[rleligious wishes of a parent shall include wishes that the child be placed in the same
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is still uncertain as to how these amendments will be interpreted and
reconciled with preexisting statutory language. The new statutes do not
establish specific guidelines and may well result in subjective and conflict-
ing interpretations.
Subsequent to these amendments, an attempt to define the words
"when practicable" was made in In re Efrain C., 7 1 wherein a New York
family court declared religious matching to be "practicable" only if it
neither precludes nor substantially delays adoption.74 In Efrain C., the
illegitimate child of a Catholic mother was placed with a nonsectarian
agency that had found an adoptive home composed of a Protestant father
and a Jewish mother. Recognizing that no Catholic agency 7l could guaran-
religion as the parent or in a different religion from the parent or with indifference to religion
or with religion a subordinate consideration." N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr § 116(g) (McKinney
1975); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 373(7) (McKinney 1976). Thus, if a parent expresses a prefer-
ence that his or her child be placed with adoptive parents of a different faith, that request
should now be granted.
7:1 63 Misc. 2d 1019, 314 N.Y.S.2d 255 (Family Ct. N.Y. County 1970), discussed in 20 BUFFALO
L. REV. 735 (1971).
7 Although the court did not specifically define substantial delay, it concluded that a delay
in excess of 1 or 2 months would be detrimental. 63 Misc. 2d at 1026, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
71 The State of New York delegates its responsibility towards homeless children to volunteer
child-care agencies which receive public funding, most of which are established and main-
tained on religious bases. A current suit, Wilder v. Sugarman, Civil No. 73-2644 (S.D.N.Y.,
filed June 14, 1973), challenges the validity of New York's statutory scheme, attacking the
procedure as a violation of the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first amendment,
the cruel and inhuman treatment clause of the eighth amendment, and the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The Wilder plaintiffs allege that the
number of voluntary agencies is insufficient to provide for the number of Protestant children
in need of placement and that the Catholic and Jewish agencies discriminate in favor of
children of their respective faiths. Thus, the plaintiffs, who are predominantly black and
Protestant, contend that they are being denied equal services and criticize the New York City
practice of maintaining a child welfare system that is controlled by agencies organized along
religious lines. They further argue that the New York State regulations requiring the place-
ment of a child in an agency of his or her religious faith are unconstitutional. Complaint for
Plaintiff at 11, id.
Plaintiff's contention that the statutes are actually mandatory is supported by In re
Glavas, 203 Misc. 590, 121 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. County 1953), where the court
declined to interpret the "when practicable" statutory language as an attentuation of the
requirements of religious matching, stating: "It is mandatory, therefore, that, when practica-
ble, a child should be placed in the custody of persons or agencies of the same religious faith
or persuasion as that of the child." Id. at 591-92, 121 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
The strength of the religious matching requirement is indicated by the existence of a
statute requiring a statement by the court or other official body of the reasons for a placement
with an agency or persons of a religious affiliation different for that of the child. N.Y. Soc.
SERV. LAW § 373(5) (McKinney 1976) provides:
[11f letters of adoption of a child are granted to a person or persons whose religious
faith is different from that of the child or if a child is committed to an agency,
association, corporation, society or institution, which is under the control of persons
of a religious faith different from that of the child, the court, public board, commission
or official shall state or recite the facts which impelled such disposition to be made
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tee immediate placement, the court declared that it would be constitution-
ally impermissible to allow the State to enforce the religious wishes of the
biological parent where such enforcement would be detrimental to the
child's welfare. The court stated:
It is clear that the State unconstitutionally denies to a child the equal protec-
tion of the laws-specifically his right to equal protection of his welfare-if
it deprives him of the opportunity for a beneficial adoption because of his
birth to a parent of a particular religion or religious preference.7
The 1970 New York amendments are especially significant because
they direct conformity, not with the child's religion, but with the requested
religious preference of the parents. Thus, the statutes seemingly incorpo-
rate the traditional principle, "religio sequitur patrem. ' '77 After the enact-
ment of these amendments, New York courts continued to follow the dis-
cretionary approach. In In re Child,"' the court held that a difference in
religion between the petitioners and the child is not sufficient reason to
deny adoption if the child's best interests would be served by the adoption.
Moreover, the court indicated that the child's best interests must prevail
over the preferences of the biological parents." Subsequently, in Dickens
v. Ernestoy the New York Court of Appeals described religion as a rele-
vant but neither controlling nor exclusive factor. 1
contrary to the religious faith of the child or to any person whose religious faith is
different from that of the child and such statement shall be part of the minutes of the
proceeding, and subject to inspection by the board or an authorized agency.
For a thorough analysis of the constitutionality under the first and fourteenth amend-
ments of New York's statutory system for child-care agencies, see Note, With The Best of
Intentions: The Constitutionality of the Statutory Scheme for Voluntary Child-Care Agencies
in New York, 4 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 21 (1974).
Whether the Wilder court will be persuaded by the constitutional attack on New York's
current system of religious matching is, of course, open to speculation. That court has already
ruled that the system does not on its face violate the establishment clause. Wilder v. Sugar-
man, 385 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (three-judge court). As of yet, however, no decision
has been reached as to whether the system is unconstitutional in its application. If this
challenge is sustained, the impact and implications would be tremendous, for the entire
system of child-care services in New York would seemingly have to be reorganized along
nonsectarian lines. It should be noted that this case must be distinguished from Child v.
Beame, Civil No. 75-336 (S.D.N.Y., filed Apr. 23, 1975), discussed in text accompanying
notes 39-42 supra, in that Wilder deals primarily with the placement of children in agencies,
whereas Beame deals with the placement of children by agencies in homes.
7' 63 Misc. 2d at 1028, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
' See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
7' 37 App. Div. 2d 78, 322 N.Y.S.2d 532 (4th Dep't 1971).
7, Id. at 79, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 533.
" 30 N.Y.2d 61, 281 N.E.2d 153, 330 N.Y.S.2d 346 (1972), appeal dismissed, 407 U.S. 917
(1972), discussed in 1 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 106 (1972).
" 30 N.Y.2d at 64, 281 N.E.2d at 155, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 347. Dickens also upheld the constitu-
tionality of the New York statutory provisions, cited in note 63 supra, dealing with the
placement of children in adoptive homes with parents of the child's religion. The decision,
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THE AGE FACTOR
Disputes over the age factor usually do not arise in cases where the
parents are considered too young, but instead, where it is alleged that they
are too old to create an ideally matched family. The problem arises when
the ages of the prospective parents and the child are considered too dispar-
ate, as when adults in their fifties and sixties petition to adopt a young
child.2
An argument frequently made is that no one beyond child-bearing age
should be permitted to adopt a child. Theories which advocate the preclu-
sion of adoptions by older couples are based primarily upon doubts about
the capabilities of people in their fifties to cope with a small child and to
manage an adolescent in their sixties. 3 According to this line of reasoning,
the adoptive couple will create the image of grandparents, rather than, as
intended, parents. In addition, the greater susceptibility of an older parent
to death or serious illness increases the risk that the child will experience
the damaging emotional effects which events of this kind may produce.
Since recent judicial decisions indicate a steady erosion of age differential
matching requirements, 4 it would appear that courts are no longer per-
suaded by these theories.
No legislation can be found prescribing a maximum age for adoptive
parents. There are, however, statutes which require a minimum age differ-
ence between the adoptive parents and the child. Nine jurisdictions have
enacted statutory limitations on comparative ages. In seven of these states,
the adoptive parent must be at least 10 years older than the adoptee,"' and
in the other two states, 15 years is the minimum differential. " Only one
state has a statute authorizing adoption "regardless of age.""7 In the vast
however, should not be dispositive of the issues in Wilder v. Sugarman, Civil No. 73-2644
(S.D.N.Y., filed June 14, 1973), discussed in note 75 supra, for the Wilder district court
found Dickens not to be controlling since it did not involve state funding for religious institu-
tions. 385 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
1 In re Haun, 31 Ohio Misc. 9, 277 N.E.2d 258 (P. Ct. 1971), afi'd, 31 Ohio App. 2d 63, 286
N.E.2d 478 (1972) (petitioners aged 68 and 55); In re S, 538 P.2d 947 (Ore. Ct. App. 1975)
(petitioners aged 57 and 58); McGowen v. McGowen, 364 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963)
(petitioners aged 66 and 49); In re Tachick, 60 Wis. 2d 540, 210 N.W.2d 865 (1973) (petitioners
aged 59 and 53).
' For an article strongly advocating legislation on mandatory minimum age differentials in
order to effectuate the concept that adoption imitates nature, see Wadlington, Minimum Age
Differences as a Requisite for Adoption, 1966 DUKE L.J. 392.
' See cases cited note 91 infra; cases cited note 82 supra.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 222 (West Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.241 (1969) (if adoptee an
adult); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-402 (1973); NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.020 (1973) (if adoptee a child);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-22 (Supp. 1975); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-2 (1967); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-30-2 (1953). The California and New Jersey statutes, however, specifically vest
discretion in the courts to circumvent the 10-year requirement.
" IDAHO CODE § 16-1502 (Cum. Supp. 1975); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-4-2 (1976) (if adoptee a
child).
" ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 531 (Supp. 1975).
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majority of jurisdictions, legislation does not provide for any mandatory
age difference.
In no other area is the practice of matching less stringently enforced
by the courts than in that of age differences. Older couples are now no
longer foreclosed from adopting a young child simply because of an age
gap, especially when the child has been living with them for a considerable
time prior to the adoption petition.", When evaluating the couple as pro-
spective parents, courts no longer look only at the ages of those concerned,
but also take into account other material factors. For example, one New
York court was strongly influenced by such factors as the good health,
financial security, and other apparent qualifications of the petitioners."
After specifically noting that New York had no statute providing for age
requirements, the court approved an adoption petition by a husband and
wife aged 59 and 47 respectively.
New York is not the only jurisdiction which, with increasing fre-
quency, has refrained from denying adoptions for reasons of the adoptive
parents' age.91 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin recently granted an adop-
tion petition by the paternal grandparents, aged 59 and 53, of an illegiti-
mate child who had resided with them since birth.' The court criticized
the trial court for its failure to give sufficient weight to the child's best
interests and for its overemphasis on the petitioners' age and health. Em-
ploying the term "psychological parents" to explain the grandparents'
relationship to the child, the court expressed awareness of the damaging
effect removal from the grandparents' home would have had upon the
child. 2
CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to present an objective view of the trends
and controversies surrounding the use of matching requirements in adop-
11 See, e.g., In re Michelle Lee T., 44 Cal. App. 3d 699, 117 Cal. Rptr. 856 (Ct. App. 1975)
(petitioners aged 71 and 55); In re Duke, 95 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 1957) (en banc) (petitioners aged
48 and 63); In re Brown, 85 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1956) (petitioners aged 57 and 53); Madsen v.
Chasten, 7 Ill. App. 3d 21, 286 N.E.2d 505 (1972) (petitioners aged 53 and 58).
' In re Michael D., 37 App. Div. 2d 78, 322 N.Y.S.2d 532 (4th Dep't 1971).
0 See, e.g., Madsen v. Chasten, 7 I1. App. 3d 21, 286 N.E.2d 505 (1972) (petitioners aged 53
and 58).
11 In re Tachick, 60 Wis. 2d 540, 210 N.W.2d 865 (1973).
9I Id. at 551-53, 210 N.W.2d at 871-72. The term "psychological parents" was first articulated
in GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5. It is interesting to note that in dealing with the age factor courts
have relied to a considerable extent upon the theories postulated in this invaluable treatise.
See, e.g., In re Michelle Lee T., 44 Cal. App. 3d 699, 706-08, 117 Cal. Rptr. 856, 860-61 (Ct.
App. 1975); In re S, 538 P.2d 947, 948-49 (Ore. Ct. App. 1975). In In re S, the court stated
that if age were the only factor militating against approval of an adoption, it "usually would
be considered overcome by need of the child for continuity of the only parental relationship
he has had." Id. at 948. See also In re McClure, 535 P.2d 112 (Ore. Ct. App. 1975); In re
Ellenwood, 532 P.2d 259 (Ore. Ct. App. 1975).
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tion proceedings. It is clear that the utilization of matching criteria, partic-
ularly the criteria of race and religion, remains an important part of the
adoption process. There does exist, however, a general trend toward greater
flexibility in the application of these standards, particularly in those cases
where the strict application of matching requirements would preclude or
significantly delay adoption.
